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Response: The Meaning of Corporate
Social Responsibility
Variations on a Theme of Edwin
M. Epstein
By ALFRED F. CONARD*

Practitioners, students, teachers, and writers on the law of corporations will be grateful to Professor Epstein for his comprehensive survey
and analysis of the problems customarily discussed under the headings
of "corporate social responsibility." His collection and analysis of
commentaries permit us to find in a single essay nearly all the ideas
that have been expressed on the subject.
If one needed convincing, one could no longer doubt after reading
Professor Epstein's article that the power of megacorporations inevitably carries with it responsibility for the total effects of corporate activities on the socioeconommic order. One would probably appreciate
much more sharply than ever before the twofold character of responsibility-both for effects and for means. Professor Epstein illuminates
with considerable originality the differences between responsibility for
the effects of corporate behavior ("product responsibility") and responsibility for listening to employees, consumers, and environmentalists in
the course of decision-making ("process responsibility").
Having accepted Professor Epstein's theses, we are led irresistibly
to questions that lie beyond them. In particular, what does "corporate
social responsibility" (which I will abbreviate as CSR) mean to the
many people who use the term?
On the basic level, CSR is urged as a justification for the regulaof
tion products of corporations-the goods they produce, the pollution
they emit, and the wages they pay. The meaning of CSR in this context
may be characterized as the "regulatory justication"meaning. Hardly
anyone would challenge the validity of the concept in this sense; even
Milton Friedman concedes that competition should be carried out
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"within the rules of the game." All that remains in dispute is the balance of benefit, in particular instances, between regulation and
freedom.
On a slightly more advanced level, CSR implies the duty of corporations to comply with the regulations that the government makes.
This formulation may be called the "regulatory compliance" meaning.
The idea is that a corporation should obey the state's regulations of its
economic activity, even though the prohibited acts are not inherently
evil, and may even be, in the executives' view, beneficial to the community. Corporations should not, for instance, dump mercury unlawfully
into streams even if the amounts seem harmless and are probably undetectible; they should not install in cars required antipollution devices
that are easily disconnected. This conception is also one to which no
one would want to dissent openly, although many businessmen believe
privately that some regulatory provisions (especially in the area of
competition law) are more honored in the breach than in observance.
A third possible meaning of CSR relates to the roles of corporation
executives in relation to the regulations that produce the "rules of the
game." It may be called the "regulatory leadership" meaning. It may
be illustrated by the activity of a number of insurance companies in
relation to "no-fault" automobile accident insurance. In the short run,
no-fault insurance appeared to be disadvantagous to insurers. It reduced premiums, and thereby reduced the volume of money on which
the insurance companies could expect to make a profit. More seriously,
it was often accompanied by governmental orders for premium cuts
that greately exceeded the economies that insurers expected to realize.
Moreover, the no-fault system is one that appears to lend itself more
readily to replacement by government-administered programs of health
and disability insurance. Nevertheless, a considerable number of companies decided to support the system. They may have had some longterm advantages in mind, but these were problematical.
An interesting comparison with the role of insurance companies in
no-fault legislation is supplied by the actions of the Ford Motor Company, which decided in the mid-fifties that safety devices like padded
dashboards and seat belts would be appropriate, and actively promoted
them as extra-price options. After one or two poor selling seasons, the
officers concluded that the public was not ready for safety devices, and
stopped actively promoting them (although retaining them as options).
Under the "regulatory leadership" conception of CSR, they might
rather have proceeded to advocate legislation requiring all manufacturers to provide these devices, thus freeing themselves from a competitive
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disadvantage and extending the benefits of the devices. Probably there
are scores of details every year about which automobile executives are
aware of possible improvements in the public interest, but refrain from
suggesting governmental action to impose them.
This meaning of CSR is one that many corporate executives seem
to find unacceptable. Newspaper reports present a picture of automobile manufacturers opposing nearly every step in safety and antipollution legislation. The picture may be false, because only conflicts make
news, and because when manufacturers do favor a regulation they find
it politically wiser to keep their faces in the background. In addition,
many probably believe in all sincerity that governmental controls are
so inevitably clumsy that they do more harm than good, even when the
conduct mandated is beneficial. On the other hand, executives in highly regulated industries, such as railroads and trucking lines have come
to regard regulation as a security blanket in whose production they are
eager to join.
A fourth possible meaning of CSR-and definitely the most controversial-involves the idea that corporate managers should voluntarily reduce profits in order to pay more to employees, or charge less to
customers, or emit less pollution into the biosphere. This definition
may be called the "reallocation" meaning. The classic example of this
conception can be illustrated by the declaration in 1916 by Henry Ford
that Ford Motor Company had made more than enough profits, and
would share future profits with workers and consumers by simultaneously raising wages and cutting prices. The Supreme Court of Michigan' ruled that Henry should not divert profits from shareholders to
employees and consumers; many recent commentators have concluded
that Henry's view was preferable to the court's.
Whether Henry's actual motives were as altruistic as his professions has been questioned, in view of certain historical facts. Two of
Ford's principal shareholders, the Dodge brothers, had recently decided to graduate from making parts for Ford to making whole
automobiles for themselves. Henry's dividend reduction cut the subsidy that Ford dividends were providing to the Dodges, and his price
reduction made it more difficult for the Dodges to meet Ford's competition. But since we are studying the meaning of CSR, rather than the
psyche of Henry Ford, let us consider the implications of the principles
that Henry avowed.
The situation of Ford Motor Company in 1916, which makes the
1.
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CSR question of that date so easy for commentators, was very unusual.
The company was paying dividends of over $10,000,000 a year to original investors who had contributed no more than $100,000 in initial capital. Clearly, their dividends could be cut without imperilling the
company's ability to finance itself. In fact, Henry's modest proposal
was to cut the annual dividends to $1,200,000, or 1200% of the original
investment.
If it was laudable in 1916 to sacrifice dividends in the interests of
employees and consumers, the question arises whether it would be
equally laudable in 1979 to cut the dividends of present-day Ford
shareholders for similar purposes. The current shares are derived
through splits, share dividends, and recapitalizations from those issued
in 1903; each one represents an original contribution of about one tenth
of a cent. But most present shareholders got their shares directly or
indirectly from the Ford Foundation, which sold them at various prices
(adjusted for splits) from about $25 to about $40. At the end of 1978,
the market price was about $40, and the total invested capital per share
(including reinvested profits) was about $80. If the managers would be
justified in diverting excessive profits from shareholders, do profits become excessive when they surpass a fair return on $.001, on $25, on
$40, or on $80?
A more rational approach might be to ask, "What degree of diversion would impair the company's ability to raise the funds that it needs
in order to discharge efficiently its responsibilites to employees, consumers, and the biosphere?" This question is much like that asked and
answered daily (and very diversely) in the regulation of public utility
companies. Companies constantly need to increase their investment,
partly because rising requirements of safety and pollution control and
increasing scarcity of materials require more expensive equipment and
processes. Companies can increase their assets by borrowing money,
but only if their equity increases proportionately. In order to increase
their equity, they have to have enough earnings to plow in some profits,
or to pay dividends that will attract new equity investments.
Although the need for profits is commonly explained (in a capitalist system) as a means of inducing investment, the need is just as inexorable in noncapitalist economies. In the socialist countries of Eastern
Europe, it appears that established enterprises are expected not only to
finance themselves, but also to produce a surplus that the banks can
then lend to the new and failing enterprises. As a consequence, the
demand for profits (under some other name) is probably at least as
great as under the capitalist system.
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Whatever may be the profit level needed to maintain operations,
there will be some companies above it (as was Ford Motor Company in
1916). By the excess-profits test, these companies could afford voluntarily to reduce prices, raise wages, or reduce pollution. They would still
be faced with difficult problems in deciding which of these objectives
should have priority.
Many other companies operate at a profit level below that which
would permit them to continue operations indefinitely without raising
prices, lowering wages, increasing pollution, or impairing still further
their financial viablility. In the automobile industry, American Motors
and Chrysler may be in this position. In the steel industry, most or all
of the American major producers may be in it, too; on the representation that they cannot otherwise fulfill their other obligations, they have
persuaded the U. S. government to raise domestic prices by means of
import "trigger prices."
Considering the severe effects that rising steel prices have on the
inflationary spiral, should steel companies reduce their prices at the expense of investors? Considering the oppressive pollution of the atmosphere in the area of Gary, Indiana, should steel companies further
reduce their emissions at the expense of investors? If investor interests
are to be sacrificed, who are the worthiest beneficiaries-the consumers
(through reduced prices), the employees (through increased wages), or
the inhabitants of the county (through reduced pollution)?
These questions are largely academic, so long as directors are
elected by shareholders. Although shareholders have been notoriously
indifferent to management maneuvers, they would probably react vigorously against a professed policy of sacrificing their interests for the
benefit of consumers, employees or neighbors. Consequently, if the
"reallocation" theory of CSR is to be followed, a radical change must
be made in the composition of governing boards. In addition to investor representatives, boards would have employee, consumer, and environmental representatives, who would presumably trade off their
respective interests, perhaps in the same way that senators from Maine
and Arizona trade-off reclamation expenditures for harbor improvements. A key determinant of the results would be the number of
representives awarded to each constituency. Of course the present legal
rules on fiduciary responsibility of directors "to the corporation" would
have to be rewritten.
These considerations point toward the conclusion that one cannot
realistically expect to see a massive reallocation of the benefits of enterprise from investors to other constituencies, and that an attempt at mas-
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sive reallocation would be likely to prove unproductive eventually,
even for those whom it sought to benefit. But this does not mean that a
recognition of CSR cannot make substantial changes in the social product of enterprise. A change in the attitudes of enterprise leaders toward
safety and environmental regulation would probably lead to considerable social gains, even without changes in voluntary "reallocation."
In the area of "reallocation," there are possible improvements that
are feasible without being massive. For example, a major safety improvement in door locks was made by automobile manufacturers in the
1950's. Safety engineers discovered that the car door lock then in
use-resembling the door lock on a house-tended to spring open
when the car rolled over, thereby spilling the passengers, who were
then crushed by the rolling car. The lock was redesigned so that it
would not open under these conditions, and all the manufacturers
quickly adopted the improvement, even though the change involved
costs. Admittedly there were potential savings in liability for accidents,
but the choice was probably made because the change was good for
customers, and the expense was so small that neither customers nor
investors would be conscious of paying for it.
There are of course thousands of similar actions taken by corporate managers in the interests of consumers, employees, or the biosphere that were not compelled by law, but involved some reallocation
of benefits from investors to other constituencies. Although managers
like to trumpet these good works in TV commercials, they generally
evade admitting that any profits were diverted. Thus, reallocation
flourishes, like executive perquisites, in a clandestine atmosphere in
which nearly everyone agrees it is a pretty good thing so long as it does
not become perceptible in financial statements.
Professor Epstein's exposition of CSR, together with the numerous
others that he cites, will contribute to bringing CSR out of the closet,
and to the conscious and avowed balancing of investor interests against
other interests that have legitimate claims on the enterprise. But we
should not expect CSR-however openly it may be avowed-to solve
the problems of personnel, pollution, and prices in the steel industry or
in other industries in which the gap between current and ideal performance is very wide. With this understanding, nearly everyone should
feel safe in praising and promoting Corporate Social Responsibility.

